Apresentamos, nestc trabalho, uma revisao da teoria de jogos repetidos onde as participantcs sao rcprescntados por maquinas (computadorcs). Tal 'rep resentac;ao nos permite analisar aspectos referentcs aos custos envolvidos no pro cesso de tomada de dccisocs, a racionalidade dos jogadorcs, e a existcncia de equilfbrios cooperativQs.
Introduction.
The issue of bounded rationality has been in the list of "next hot topic" since Simon's observations in the fifties (see Simon 1972 Simon , 1978 . However, since theorists faced an enormous difficulty to ac count for proced ural aspects of decision making in formal models, the discussion of this important issue has been postponed for a long time. Aumann (1981) was the fi rst to suggest the study of decision making through the usc of repeated games played by finite automata. Rubinstein's (1986) and Abreu and Rubinstein's (1988) captured this idea and suggested some new results in the theory of noncooperative games.
For the infinitely repeated prisoners' dilemma game of table 1, the Folk Theorem of repeated game theory predicts that the shaded region in figure 1 represents the sets of payoff pairs that can be achieved by equilibrium play. Abreu and Rubinstein, on the other hand, accounting for procedural costs, proved that the Nash equi librium outcomes in this automaton selection game are the rational points lying on the cross shown on figure l.
The technique of using machines to replace players during the game has also been used in the search of new equilibrium concepts that could explain the frequent occurrence of cooperative outcomes in experiments, and also to account for the philosophical argument that economic environments are not either totally cooperative or noncoop erative. In particular, Binmore and Samuelson redefined the notion of an evolutionary stable strategy to account for complexity measures, and their refinement predicts the cooperative outcome.
The outline of this paper is as follows: section 2 contains the basic definitions. We analyze, in section 3, Rubinstein's (1986) and Abreu and Rubinstein's (1988) contributions, which represented a major change in some concepts of the orthodox game theory. We fur ther discuss Banks and Sundaram's (19 89 ) extension of Abreu and Rubinstein' s work, where they suggested alternative and more gen eral measures of complexity. Binmore and Samuelson's contribution is presented in section 4, where some concepts of evolutionary game theory are discussed. Fi nally, in section 5 we present the main conclusions and suggestions for further research.
Definitions.
In this section we follow Rubinstein (1986) and Abreu and Ru binstein (1988) . In section 4, additional defi nitions regarding evolu tionary game theory will be stated.
DEFINITION 1: Let G = (81, 82, u/, U2) denote a two-person game in normal form, where 8i is a finite set of actions for player i and Ui: 81 x 82 -... R is i's payoff function. DEFINITION 2: The set of Nash equilibria for G(N(G)) is defi ned by all pairs (si, S2) satisfying: u1(si,si) 2: U1(S1,S2) and u2(si,s2) 2: u2(si, S2), l;I(s1, S2) E 81 x 82,
DEFINITION 3: The supergame of G, denoted by Goo, is an infinite sequence of repetitions of G at t = 1,2, 3 .... At period t, players simultaneously" select an element of 8i, de noted s;, which becomes common knowledge. The players determine a sequence of actions in the super game Goo by selecting at the same time finite automata, which will be represented by Moore machines. I DEFINITION 4: A Machinc that can rcplace player i in the game, denoted Mi, is a four-tuple (Qi,q}, Ai, /l.i) where Qi is a finite set of states, q} E Qi is thc initial statc, Ai: Qi -+ Si is the output function, and /l.i: Qi x Sj -+ Qi is the transition function.
Wc show in figure 2 below somc examples of machines of at most 2 states. The lctters inside the circles represcnt the state of the machine, and the arrows thc transition functions. For instance, the machines recommend C whcn the statc is qc (respectively D whcn the state is qD)' The lettcrs on the arrows reprcsent the opponent's choice of action, and the arrows themselves represent the transitions.
A pair of machines (MI, M2) induces a sequence of state pairs (q t ) and action pairs (st) as follows:
DEFINITION 5: Let Ti denote the length of the cycle of q;, and T that of q'. 2 The first cycle has length t2 -t l + 1. Also, denote by t < tl the pre-cycle period.
Thus qt = (qi, qi) denotes a sequence of states of the machines, and st = (si, s�) denotes the sequence of actual plays of the su pergame. Since machines are finite, there must cxist a minimal t2, t2 � t, such that qt l = qt2+ l , i. e., at period t 2 + 1 the pair of statcs repeats itself for the first time. Hence, we have (q l , ... qt l -I ) as the pre-cycle states, and (q", . . . , qt2) as the cycle of the play of the pairs (MI, M2). The following cxample will help to clarify the notation, EXAMPLE: Let MI be thc machine "grim" , and M2 be the machine "defect", both represented in figure 2. The sequence of plays of the game can be representcd by the following chain:
Note that in this particular example t + 1 is the pre-cycle st.ate, and the lengt.h of the cycle is equal to 1 (t2 = t l = 1).
As Banks and Sundaram (1989) pointed out, stationarity of the output and transition functions imply the equality of the continuation of q ' after t2 + 1 and that after t1.
DEFINITION 6: Let 7fi (NIr, M2) denote the repeated game payoff in duced by the machines (Mr, M2)' As in Abreu and Rubinstein (1988) , the payoffs can be evaluated according to the following criteria:
Note that the LHS of (5) is the average payoff in the cycle period, since in the limit the pre-cycle payoff is ignored. The discount factor in (6) is given by 6 . .
For the moment let the complexity of a machine be defined as the number of states it contains, denoted by 1 Q, I. Later we will give alternative definitions for complexity, following Banks and Sundaram (1989) . 
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Repeated games by finite automata
3. Prisoner's dilemma games played by finite automata: noncooperative outcomes.
In this section we present theoretical arguments predicting non cooperative outcomes for the game above. In particular, Rubinstein (1986) suggested a new modeling technique for an old idea. The orthodox game theory does not account for the fact that rules of behavior are costly to operate and decision makers try to minimize these costs. Rubinstein suggested that players should use a Moore machine to play the repeated prisoners' dilemma game discussed in the introduction. Now, players will consider, in addition to the payoffs of the su pergame, the complexity of the machines they use. Rubinstein as sumes that at each period a player pays a fee for each of the states maintained in his machine, regardless of the frequency of its usage (infi nitesimal maintenance costs).
In this framework a semi-perfect equilibrium is a pair of machines such that:
(a) neither of the players can achieve a higher payoff by a unilateral change of his own machine;
(b) neither of the players is able to reduce the number of states used.
As mentioned in the introduction, the Nash equilibrium for the one-shot game is (D,D). However, for the repeated game the Folk theorem predicts that any feasible and individually rational payoff is a Nash equilibrium (the shaded area in figure 1).
Rubinstein showed that a solution for the repeated game when players choose a machine to play in their place must be either (0, 0) or an interval point on the segment combining (0,2) and (2, 0). In particular, (2,2) is not a solution.
Rubinstein assumes that payoffs are given by limit of means, and
We also have the following defi nitions:
DEFINITION 2': A Nash equilibrium for this repeated game played by the finite automata is defined as a pair of machines (Mi , M2) such that:
Note that the notion of SPE differs from the Nash Equilibrium concept in the requirement that M; be optimal for player i against Mj not only at the beginning of the game but also at the start of each repetition. The two results obtained by Rubinstein are:3
( a) Vi , the states q;', .. . , q;' are distinct
or 3 a rational number a sucll tllat:
Thus, during a cycle no player will repeat the same states twice, and at a solution each player keeps track of his exact position in the cycle. Also, solutions are all on one of the two diagonals of figure 1.
It is worthwhile to note that a Nash equilibrium need not to be a SPE. In addition, more realistic models should allow for a trade-off between payoffs and procedural costs (which are represented here in a lexicographic way, like a "fiat fee").
3For the proofs of these and the following propositions readers should refer to the original papers.
Two other criticisms, namely, restriction to lexicographic pref erences and alternative measures of complexity, will be addressed respectively by Abreu and Rubinstein (1988) , and Banks and Sun daram (1989) .
Abreu and Rubinstein provided a necessary condition on the form of equilibrium strategies and plays, whereas previons studies have typically focused on equilibrium payoffs, or shown that a par ticular subset of strategies was sufficient.
These results generalize the previous paper since they are valid when payoffs are evaluated either by limit of means or discounting payoffs, and preferences need to satisfy only weakly mono tonicity in the following sense: If (Mi' Mj) yields player i the same repeated game payoff as (M[, Mj), then player i strictly prefers
Under this framework, Abreu and Rubinstein showed that in a Nash equilibrium the two machines have an equal number of states, and maximize repeated game payoffs against one another. Despite complexity considerations, players choices are optimal in equilibrium.
States are partioned into those that are used in the cycle and those that are not. A particular cycle state might appear more than once within the cycle, and noncycle states might be repeated in the initial periods of play before the cycle begins. Noncycle states and cycle states are connected. The states of a player's machine that ap pear in the cycle are all distinct. All other states appear consecutively at the beginning of play and are never repeated. There is an intu itive interpretation for the last remark, namely, both players show the ability to punish before the machine pair can enter the cyclical phase.
As a consequence, two machines always have an equal number of cycle and noncycle states respectively, and there exists a one-to one correspondence between the periods of equilibrium play.
Thus, complexity considerations reduce the set of Nash equilibria predicted by the Folk theorem, since given the introduction of imple mentation costs, a small perturbation of the model has, because of strategic considerations, large consequences.
Abreu and Rubinstein also pointed out that complexity issues
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regarding the connection between the computations of optimal strate gies and the costs of implementing them ought to be analyzed.
Note that Rubinstein (1986) analyzed a stronger equilibrium concept: a player never wishes to drop states from their machines during the course of play, holding fixed the other player's machine, because they could only pay for states that are held in the machine forever. In contrast, Abreu and Rubinstein adopted the Nash equi librium concept, in a context in which players commit themselves to machines at the beginning of play. Although, both papers pre dict noncooperative outcomes as natural solutions for the supergame played by finite automata, namely the cross in figure l.
Finally, we discuss in the remaining of this section Banks and Sundaram's (1989) work on alternative measures of complexities. Note that Abreu and Rubinstein used the number of states as mea sure of complexity, incorporating the idea that if monitoring an op ponent's behavior is costly, players will attempt to save on states held to keep track of the other's action, and if punishment states are costly to maintain, players will eliminate such states if they are never used. Hence, "empty" threats to take certain actions cannot exist in equilibrium.
It is important to note that Abreu and Rubinstein's measure ignores important aspects such as the complexity of the transition mechanism. Banks and Sundaram illustrate this argument using a very simple example. Take, for instance, the following machines showed in figure 2: "dummy", "grim", and "tit-for-tat". All these three machines have two states and have equal complexity according to Abreu and Rubinstein's defi nition.
Yet, Banks and Sundaram argue that the machines have an in creasing degree of complexity in the case that its definition accounts for the number of transitions. Note that: (a) the "dummy" machine has two states and two transition functions; (b) the "grim" machine has two states and three transition functions; (c) the "tit-for-tat" machine has two states and four transition functions.
Given a machine Mi for player i, a machine Mj is at least as
Mj yields a repeated game payoff at least as high as Mj, and Mj is at most as complex as Mj. (10) Such preferences include the case where transitional complexity enters lexicographically, but also includes other cases. In particular, it allows for the case where players use different complexity measures from each other, refl ecting possible differential advantages.
Their main result can be stated as: "under any of these measures, any Nash equilibrium of the machine game is . such that at each stage of the repeated game the players adopt one-shot Nash equilibrium actions." In the payoff space, if preferences arc lexicographic with repeated game payoffs evaluated according to the limit of means, the only equilibrium payoffs to the players are those that are convex combinations of stage-game Nash equilibrium payoffs, i.e., in the case of the above game, the only Nash equilibrium is "defect" forever.
They consider three different measures of complexity, described below, where the following notation is used: R(qi) denotes the num ber of distinct transitions from qi E Qi, i.e. , it is the number of equivalence classes at qi, where Sj and sj are equivalent at qi if ILi(qi, Sj) = ILi(qi, sj); R(Mj) denotes the number of distinct tran sitions in Mi, i.e., R(Mi) = L:q,EQ, R(qi). Note that in general, none of the measures need nest any of the others. Their main result can be formalized as follows.
Theorem 3. For all (Mi, M2) E N(Gm), (a) (Ai(qi), A2(qm E N(G),Vt, i.e., any Nash equilibrium of the machine game induces one-shot Nash equilibrium actions at each stage of the repeated game.
(b) in the limit-average case the cycle begins in the first period, i. e., the set of pre-cycle states is empty. The intuition of the proof is the following: if transitions have a cost associated with them, players' machines in equilibrium must use all the available transitions. Thus, whereas in Abreu and Rubin stein (1988) a state will be discarded if it is never employed -so punishment states must occur at least once, here, a transition will be discarded if it is never employed. (By making the transition equiv alent to some transition that is employed). Therefore, punishment contingencies -those state-action pairs that lead to a punishment state, must occur at least once. Then, these contingencies are now part of the equilibrium path of play, implying there cannot be any threats in equilibrium, empty or otherwise.
The case for cooperation.
All models presented in the last section predicted noncooperative outcomes. In fact, complexity arguments could even justify the trivial Nash equilibrium as a viable solution for the infinite version of the prisoners' dilemma. However, it clearly contradicts the empirical regularity of cooperation as an equilibrium (e.g., Axelrod 1980) . Neyman (1986) gets cooperation in finite time, suggesting the necessi ty of developing a more general theory of bounded rationality and decision costs in repeated games that wonld address the issue of complexity both in terms of the computation of optimal strategies as well as the actual implementation of such strategies.
An alternative approach also generates cooperative solutions in the above game, namely the evolutionary approach. In this section we present Binmore and Samuelson's (1990) paper, where they suggest evolutionary stability as a solution concept for the game.
Remember that the finite automata have been used here to rep resent decision-makers of unbounded rationality who must delegate authority to subordinates who can execute only simple rules. In con trast, for Binmore and Samuelson, metaplayers are a metaphor for an evolutionary process. The automata represent rules-of-thumb that have evolved during past plays of the game.
Consequently, Binmore and Samuelson replace the notion of Nash equilibrium by a version of an evolutionary stable strategy (ESS).4 Although ESS may fail to exist, modified versions don't. In particular, the refi nement they employ predict the outcome "cooper ate", and only utilitarian machines (those at which the sum of the players' payoff is maximized) are sustainable as evolutionary viable equilibria.
The argument is quite simple: a non-utilitarian population is vulnerable to invasion by mutants who recognized each other by a "secret handshake".5 Thus, mutants form an insider group who co operate among themselves by treating outsiders as outsiders treat each other. As a consequence, insiders earn a higher average payoff than outsiders, and the 'latter are displaced.
In contrast with Fudenberg and Maskin (1990) , which assume that trembles intervene between a machine choosing an action and its being implemented (i.e., there is a distinction between an intended action and a realized one), Binmore and Samuelson assume that ma chines never make mistakes, only trembles at the automaton selection stage are important. Hence, trembles are those in the thinking pro cess of the players: if an opponent plays irrationally, the explanation would be that he or she reasoned irrationally. We also need an addi tional defi nition.
DEFINITION 9: A machine is said to be nice if it is never the fi rst to defect. A machine is said to be nasty if it is not nice. Therefore, the "grim", "tit-for-tat", "cooperate", and "dummy" 4a strategy that can not be invaded by any mutation. A more formal definition will be given later. 5see Robson (1990) .
Revista de Econometria 12(1) abril 1992 machines of figure 2 are nice, while the "tat-for-tit" and "defect" machines are nasty. Returning to the equilibrium selection problem, note that, as Binmore and Samuelson pointed out, although two "tat-for-tit" ma chines constitute a Nash equilibrium for the automaton selection game of Abreu and Rubinstein, a population consisting entirely of "tat-for-tit" machines is not evolutionary stable. In fact, in this framework, an ESS does not exist at all. Thus, Binmore and Samuel son investigate the assumptions under which a weaker version of an ESS may exist.
Binmore and Samuelson have the same set of assumptions as Ru binstein (1986), namely lexicographic preferences, payoffs evaluated by the limit of the means, and the number of states as measure of complexity. Given these assumptions, we have the following defini tion. It is straightforward to see that the machines "cooperate" and "defect" can both be invaded (for instance, "cooperate" can be in vaded by "tit-for-tat", since the later yields a higher payoff).
Thus theorem 4 below shows that no automaton satisfies def inition 10 for the above game. The proof is due to Binmore and Samuelson.
Theorem 4. An automaton a satisfying (11), (12) and (13) PROOF: It suffices to consider an automaton a with 2 states satisfying (11),(12), and (13). The automaton a uses action x in its initial state .. Construct a mutant b identical to a except that, if its opponent play something other than x when b is in its initial state, then b switches to a different state from that a would switch. Then P(a, a) = P(b, a) = P(a, b) = P(b, b), and a and b have the ' same complexity. Thus condition (13) Note that complexity is now much more important because its inc! usion means that a mess a can have no states that are not used when a plays G against itself, because otherwise a would be invaded and the invader would end up dominating a.
The key to understand this is to notice that a Mess can be in vaded by a machine that yields the same profits and has the same number of states, but this invader would not be able to multiply it self, once this would require either strict greater profits or strict lower degree of complexity. On the other hand, complexity considerations do not play such important role in the defi nition of an ESS since it eliminates the possibility of any invader, even if the mutant has the same measure of complexity.
The next two theorems give necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence of a MESS.
Theorem 5. An automaton a can be a Mess only if a is utilitarian.
Theorem 6. Let m denote the pure strategy minimax point of the underlying game G. Let u be its utilitarian outcome. A sufficient condition for the existence of a Mess is that u � m.
Remember that Abreu and Rubinstein's analysis does not lead to machines that behave only "nicely" in equilibrium. A machine can Revista de Econometria 12(1) abril 1992 be an optimal reply to itself in their framework only if it exhibits some "nasty" behavior in equilibrium, e.g, "defect". However, "defect" is not a mess because an invasion by "tit-for-tat" will expand from its initial bridgehead.
It must be stressed that the inability of a mess to repel all in vaders implies that the purity of a MESS in which the whole popula tion consists of copies of a single machine will eventually be sullied, and hence it is necessary to study polymorphous populations. We then need the following defi nitions. 
1 an 1:::; 1 b 1
The above definition implies that each machine in the poplila tion do�s at least as well as any potential invader, provided the later appears in sufficiently small number. Using the same type of argu ments of theorem 5, Binmore and Samuelson show that a necessary condition for a.population to be a mess is that F be utilitarian, and consequently for the prisoners' dilemma game, they predict the co operative outcome.
An interesting feature not discussed above, and that is mentioned by Samuelson and Zhang (1990) , regards the intuitive interpretation of mixed strategies that may be generated by evolutionary game theory. EGT allows individuals to play pure strategies, but the proportions of the population playing the various pure strategies then exhibit the characteristics of a mixed strategy.
In conclusion, their notion of evolutionary stability is a modi fication of an ESS, allowing players operating different strategies to coexist in such a way to sustain the utilitarian outcome against any potential mutant invasion. There remains an open question regard ing the case where there are repeated invasion attempts (overlapping invasions, for example), and mutations are not rare events anymore. This suggests the need to examine stronger stability requirements.
Conclusions.
First, we summarize the results discussed in this paper. Ru binstein (1986) and Abreu and Rubinstein (1988) proved that when players choose finite automata to replace them in the game, taking in account explicitly the costs of operating and maintaining the machine, the set of Nash equilibrium outcomes is much smaller than predicted by the Folk Theorem. Bauks and Sundaram (1989) considered dif ferent measures of complexity, taking in account also transition com plexity, and their main result predicted an even more restricted set of Nash equilibria for the game, namely the trivial one (defect). On the other hand, using evolutionary stability requirements, Binmore and Samuelson's refinement predicted the cooperative outcome.
Nevertheless, there are still many open questions that remain to be studied. There is clearly a need to test the robustness of all above theorems to different machine types,6 and to different games, once some of the above results are not true for the battle of sexes game. Furthermore, it is worth analyze alternative measures of complex ity, that could reflect, for instance the cost of writing the software. Finally, there is an important issue missing in Binmore and Samuel son's (1990) approach: if the frequency of the mutations is very high, as one might expect in iterative economic systems, what will be the stability requirements needed to guarantee the existence of a MESS? (Received February 1992 . Revised April 1992 6For instance, Megiddo and Wigderson (1986) showed that when players use a Turing machine the cooperative outcome of the game can be approximated in equilibrium.
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